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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Raymark Industries, Inc. ("Raymark") on this appeal 
seeks the reversal of an order of the district court denying 
it the return of a $1 million fee designated a "non- 
refundable retainer" it paid to its former counsel, Michael 
Beausang ("Beausang"), of the Pennsylvania lawfirm of 
Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan ("Butera, Beausang"). 
While Laureen Ryan as trustee of Raymark's bankruptcy 
estate has been substituted as appellant, as a matter of 
convenience we continue to refer to Raymark as the 
appellant. We set forth the unusual background of the case 
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at some length. Beginning in the early 1970s, many 
persons instituted asbestos personal injury actions against 
Raymark which was a manufacturer of asbestos-containing 
products. Apparently as a result of these claims and the 
litigation, Raymark's financial position deteriorated leading 
in 1989 to certain of its creditors filing an involuntary 
bankruptcy proceeding against it. The filing of the 
bankruptcy petition stayed the asbestos actions but the 
stay was vacated on August 9, 1996, when the bankruptcy 
court dismissed the bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
Raymark anticipated that the vacation of the stay would 
lead to a renewed high volume of asbestos litigation.1 
Accordingly, Raymark organized a nationwide network of 
attorneys to process the anticipated litigation. To secure 
legal representation, Raymark offered the potential heads of 
six trial teams a contract with a fixed-fee structure of 
quarterly payments, a set fee for costs per day at trial, and 
an initial, one-time, non-refundable payment of $1 million.2 
Raymark used this arrangement to attract counsel with 
"specific capability" as well as to overcome its history of 
nonpayment of legal fees. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We indicated in Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 
1995), that "[b]y June 26, 1988, Raymark had been named as a 
defendant in more than 68,000 cases." 
 
2. The disputed provision of September 4, 1996 Agreement provides as 
follows: 
 
       In consideration for the legal representation and services 
hereunder, 
       Raymark agrees to pay Counsel fees as follows: 
 
       (a) Initial jurisdiction legal network organizatio nal fee and 
       management fee of $1,000,000. This is a non-refundable retainer. 
 
       (b) A fixed quarterly fee of $32,000 to organize  and maintain a 
legal 
       network to handle all administrative aspects of litigation filed 
       against Raymark in the jurisdiction assigned herein. 
 
       (c) A fixed quarterly fee of $280,000 for manage ment of the 
litigation 
       filed against Raymark in the jurisdiction assigned herein. 
 
       (d) A fixed trial fee of $3,000 per day of trial  not to exceed a 
total of 
       $15,000 per trial without prior approval of Raymark. 
 
       All fees paid shall be non-refundable. 
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Raymark developed an Agreement reflecting its proposed 
arrangement for retaining counsel which, according to its 
president, James Cobb, it offered to Beausang and other 
counsel on a "take it or leave it" basis.3 The Agreement did 
not address the withdrawal of counsel,4  but included a 
provision that "Raymark may terminate this Agreement at 
will and without cause upon ninety (90) days' written notice 
to Counsel. All fees paid as of the termination date shall be 
non-refundable." Raymark and Beausang individually 
entered into the Agreement on September 4, 1996, but 
there is no doubt that other attorneys from Butera, 
Beausang, as well as Beausang personally, were to perform 
the services under the Agreement. Thus, as a practical 
matter there is no material distinction on this appeal 
between Beausang and Butera, Beausang. 
 
On September 11, 1996, Beausang sent a letter ("Letter 
Agreement") to Raymark acknowledging receipt of the $1 
million and stating that "[g]iven the significant impact on 
my practice, I would not have accepted this engagement 
had this fee not been fully earned and non-refundable." 
Cobb signed and returned that letter as "acknowledged and 
agreed." Thus, the contract documents between Raymark 
and Beausang consisted of the Agreement and Letter 
Agreement, each of which both parties signed, and each of 
which referred to the $1 million payment. See Landreth v. 
First Nat'l Bank, 31 A.2d 161, 163 (Pa. 1943) (all writings 
forming part of same transaction are interpreted together).5 
 
The Raymark-Beausang arrangement had a short 
operative life as on November 13, 1996, Raymark 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Raymark continued to employ five firms under the Agreement after 
terminating Beausang. 
 
4. Under Pennsylvania law, which the parties agree is applicable, an 
attorney "may withdraw from representation only for reasonable cause 
and upon reasonable notice." Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
809 F.2d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
5. We reject Raymark's argument that Beausang's"self-serving" Letter 
Agreement should not be regarded as part of the contract because 
Beausang wrote it after receiving the payment. While Raymark is no 
doubt correct that the Letter Agreement was self-serving, the fact is that 
Cobb signed it. 
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terminated Beausang without notice effective immediately. 
Raymark based the termination at least in part on 
Beausang's seeking up to a month's time to review the facts 
behind a complaint drafted by another attorney that 
Raymark requested Beausang to file immediately. Raymark 
hired alternate counsel the same day.6  During the 
approximately ten-week duration of the Agreement, Butera, 
Beausang recorded 335.5 hours of work for Raymark and 
incurred out-of-pocket expenses of approximately $37,000. 
On January 3, 1997, Raymark filed a complaint for 
recovery of the $1 million in the district court, predicating 
its claim on theories of rescission and breach offiduciary 
duty. Beausang thereafter filed a counterclaim seeking 
additional fees that he claimed were due under the 
Agreement. 
 
The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The district court decided the case in 
a comprehensive opinion dated December 1, 1997, and on 
December 2, 1997, entered summary judgment for 
Beausang on the complaint thus rejecting Raymark's 
claims. See Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Butera, Beausang, 
Cohen & Brennan, No. Civ. A. 97-0034, 1997 WL 746125 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1997). But the court entered judgment for 
Raymark on the counterclaim, thus leaving the parties 
where it found them. 
 
The court concluded that the Agreement was "clear and 
unambiguous," id. at *8, and was agreed upon fairly by 
sophisticated parties, id. at *10-11. The court said that its 
clear meaning was that the $1 million fee was non- 
refundable, id. at *8, and that the parties by the Agreement 
intended to secure Beausang's commitment and availability 
to represent Raymark. Id. at *13. Accordingly, the court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that Beausang surely was correct when he insisted upon 
having an opportunity to investigate the complaint. See Garr v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994). Indeed, Raymark does not 
contend that it is entitled to a return of the retainer on the theory that 
Beausang violated his obligations under the Agreement. The substituted 
attorney filed the complaint on the day that Raymark terminated 
Beausang but the court subsequently dismissed the complaint. See 
Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, No. Civ. A. 
97-0034, 1997 WL 746125, at *5 n.13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1997). 
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determined that the disputed fee was a "general retainer." 
See Id. at *13. The court also held that Beausang earned 
the fee because Raymark benefitted from paying the fee by 
attracting counsel for an unspecified amount and duration 
of work despite Raymark's history of nonpayment of legal 
fees. Furthermore, taking note of the obvious fact that 
Raymark did not "hesitate at all in terminating" Beausang, 
the court held that Raymark's right to end its relationship 
with Beausang had not been "chilled." See id. at *15. 
Therefore, the court concluded that the contract was 
equitable under McKenzie Construction, Inc. v. Maynard, 
758 F.2d 97, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1985). While as we have 
indicated, the court also rejected Beausang's counterclaim, 
inasmuch as Beausang does not cross-appeal, we need not 
explain why it did so. 
 
Raymark appealed but thereafter, on March 18, 1998, 
filed a Chapter 11 petition. See In re Raytech Corp., 222 
B.R. 19, 23 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998). Subsequently, a 
bankruptcy court appointed Laureen Ryan as trustee for 
Raymark but as we have indicated we continue to refer to 
Raymark as the appellant. The district court exercised 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332, 
and we exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
We first must determine whether the Agreement was 
enforceable, and, if so, whether or not its enforcement is 
unreasonable. In so doing, we exercise our supervisory 
power over attorney-client fee arrangements, see Dunn v. 
H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1979), a 
duty also imposed by Pennsylvania law which the district 
court applied and which the parties agree is applicable. In 
this regard, we point out that under Pennsylvania law, "[a] 
duly admitted attorney is an officer of the court and 
answerable to it for dereliction of duty." Childs v. Smeltzer, 
171 A. 883, 886 (Pa. 1934); see also In re Mitchell, 901 F.2d 
1179, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we assess the 
reasonableness of attorney-client fees "[e]ven with respect 
to market determined fees." See Coup v. Heckler, 834 F.2d 
313, 324 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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Insofar as we are aware, the Pennsylvania appellate 
courts have not determined the circumstances, if any, in 
which attorneys may use contracts providing for non- 
refundable retainers.7 Thus, the district court had little 
guidance when it made its prediction on how the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would assess the 
enforceability and reasonableness of a contractual provision 
for a non-refundable retainer. See Raymark, 1997 WL 
746125, at *7, *9. Lacking such guidance, the district court 
predicted that Pennsylvania would adopt our decision in 
McKenzie, 758 F.2d 97, to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
non-refundable retainer. The district court then concluded 
that such retainers, though subject to review for 
reasonableness, would be permissible under Pennsylvania 
law. See Raymark, 1997 WL 746125, at *10-14. The parties 
do not question the court's decision to base its analysis 
upon McKenzie, though they disagree about how to apply 
the holding in that case here.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Raymark argues that the "current trend" among other jurisdictions is 
toward limiting the use of non-refundable retainers by attorneys. Brief at 
11. This trend, however, may be in cases involving"special retainers" 
rather than "general retainers," a distinction we discuss below. See, 
e.g., 
Kelly v. MD Buyline, Inc., 2 F. Supp.2d 420, 425-27, 444-52 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998). But see Provanzano v. National Auto Credit, Inc., 10 F. Supp.2d 
44, 51 n.13 (D. Mass. 1998) (observing that "general retainers have 
largely disappeared from the modern practice of law"). 
 
The Pennsylvania Bar Association Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility Committee, in a Formal Opinion, accurately stated that 
Pennsylvania law does not bar the use of general retainers. App. at 346- 
47; Pa. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 100 (1995) (non-refundable retainers 
permissible if reasonable and not "clearly excessive"). 
 
8. The parties dispute our standard of review. Raymark understandably 
argues that inasmuch as this appeal is from an order for summary 
judgment our review is plenary. On the other hand, Beausang contends 
that we should use an abuse of discretion standard. See McKenzie 
Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 823 F.2d 43, 44 (3d Cir. 1987) (opinion 
following remand); McKenzie, 758 F.2d at 102. We need not determine 
which standard applies as we would reach the result we do exercising 
plenary review. 
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1. McKenzie Standard 
 
In McKenzie, which arose in a fee dispute rather than a 
disciplinary context, we rejected the use of a "clearly 
excessive" standard as to whether or not attorneys' fees are 
reasonable, and instead adopted an "equity and fairness 
standard." 758 F.2d at 100-02 (rejecting standard of A.B.A. 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 
2-106 (A) especially where potential unreasonableness 
arises from circumstances after fee arrangement is made). 
We asked (1) whether the attorney's conduct, as against the 
client's conduct, had resulted in a fee that enriched the 
attorney at the client's expense, and (2) whether that 
enrichment violated the court's "sense of fundamental 
fairness and equity." Id. at 101 ("[W]hen the matter is the 
enforcement of a fee contract in an adversary proceeding 
between an attorney and his former client, . . . the court is 
not deciding whether a lawyer's conduct is unethical but 
whether, as against the client, it has resulted in such an 
enrichment at the expense of the client that it offends a 
court's sense of fundamental fairness and equity."). 
 
In making this evaluation, we stated that attorney-client 
fee agreements were not to be enforced as "ordinary 
commercial contracts." Id. Rather, a court must evaluate 
the contract as to its reasonableness both as of the time 
the parties entered into it and in light of subsequent 
circumstances concerning performance and enforcement, 
which may make a contract "unfair in its enforcement." Id. 
We went on to state "that courts should be reluctant to 
disturb contingent fee arrangements freely entered into by 
knowledgeable and competent parties." Id. 
 
Applying the McKenzie standard, the district court 
reviewed Raymark's contract both at the time the parties 
entered into it and in light of Beausang's termination and 
the amount of work he performed. It concluded that the 
contract was "fair to both parties when made."9 In so doing, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Raymark appears to agree that the contract is on its face enforceable, 
arguing only that the early termination makes enforcement 
impermissible. "Raymark does not dispute that defendants' receipt of a 
$1 million non-refundable retainer was reasonable in the context of a 
30-month engagement during which defendants were expected to be 
engaged in substantial litigation . . . . Nonetheless, this $1 million fee 
became manifestly unreasonable at the time of defendants' termination 
. . ." given the limited amount of time and work devoted. Brief at 22. 
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the court considered basic principles of contract law 
because while special scrutiny is given to attorney-client 
arrangements, the relationship between attorney and client 
under Pennsylvania law nevertheless is contractual. See 
Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 809 F.2d 212, 
218 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
The court determined first that the contract was 
unambiguous, a conclusion with which we are in accord. 
Thus, this is a case in which we are concerned with 
construction rather than interpretation of a contract. See 
Dardovitch v. Haltzman, ___ F.3d ___, 1999 WL 689955, at 
*8 (3d Cir. Sept. 7, 1999). Raymark nevertheless argues 
that we should consider the intent of the parties in entering 
into the contract as expressed in a deposition of its 
consultant, Craig Smith. Brief at 4-5. The district court, 
however, correctly stated that unless the writing is 
ambiguous, the parties' mutual intent must be determined 
from the language of the writing itself. See Duquesne Light 
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 
1995) (applying Pennsylvania law). The court stressed that 
Raymark had set the Agreement's terms, the parties were 
sophisticated, and Beausang had borne the risk that, given 
the set-fee structure, his costs could exceed the payments 
received. The heart of the court's analysis of the 
enforceability of the contract, however, derives from its 
discussion of the nature of the retainer provision itself. 
 
2. General Retainer 
 
Beausang argues that the $1 million fee was non- 
refundable not only under basic contract principles but 
because it was a general retainer so that its non- 
refundability would be recognized in Pennsylvania as well 
as other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kelly v. MD Buyline, Inc., 2 
F. Supp.2d 420, 425-27, 444-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (non- 
refundable general retainers permissible though New York 
law bars non-refundable special retainers). Raymark 
counters that the retainer was a specific or special retainer, 
which by an extension of principles of professional ethics 
must be refundable. Brief at 24-25. 
 
The district court found as a matter of law that the 
Agreement more resembled a general retainer than a 
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special retainer and we agree with that conclusion.10 
However, as Raymark points out, that finding is not 
dispositive, because Pennsylvania law does not establish 
definitively that non-refundable general retainers are 
lawful. Nevertheless, the district court's ruling in that 
regard does bolster its conclusion that the contract was 
enforceable under the McKenzie standard. 
 
The distinction between general and specific retainers is 
well established. A retainer is general "where the services 
being purchased are the attorney's `availability' to render a 
service if and as needed in a specific time frame" and thus 
is "earned when paid." On the other hand, a retainer is 
special or specific "where the funds paid are for a specific 
service." In that circumstance, the retainer remains the 
client's property if the contemplated services are not 
provided. See In re Gray's Run Tech., Inc., 217 B.R. 48, 52- 
53 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997); see also Kelly, 2 F. Supp.2d at 
425-27.11 
 
In Gray's Run, the bankruptcy court held that an 
attorney's claim to retain a non-refundable retainer, 
described in the contract as "an advance fee retainer" and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Raymark argues that the distinction is immaterial under 
Pennsylvania law, and that determining whether this is a general or 
special retainer is in any case a fact-intensive issue that is 
inappropriate 
for summary judgment. Reply Brief at 3-4. Yet the distinction is at least 
useful towards analyzing the propriety of the contract, even if it is not 
dispositive. Federal bankruptcy courts confronted with similar issues 
arising in Pennsylvania have discussed the distinction. See, e.g., In re 
Gray's Run Tech., Inc., 217 B.R. 48, 52-53 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997). 
 
11. Special or specific retainers have been sub-divided into security 
retainers and advance fee retainers. An attorney holds a security retainer 
to "secure payment of fees for future services." A security retainer is to 
be applied "to charges for services actually rendered, normally after the 
submission and approval of an application for compensation." The 
second kind of special retainer is the advance fee retainer arrangement, 
in which "the attorney receives payment in advance for contemplated 
legal services and depletes the prepaid fund as services are rendered. 
Advance fee retainers differ from security retainers in that ownership of 
the funds is intended to pass to the attorney at the time of the payment." 
In re The Renfrew Ctr. of Fla., Inc., 195 B.R. 335, 338-39 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1996). 
 
                                10 
  
as "our payment in advance for contemplated legal 
services," could not be upheld because it was a special 
retainer. In that case, the agreement for the attorney's 
services described the retainer as an "advance" payment for 
a specific service rather than as a payment for the 
purchase of the attorney's availability. See Gray's Run, 217 
B.R. at 51-52. In reaching its conclusion, the court 
considered the following facts (but did not hold them out as 
a test or inclusive list): that no reference was made in the 
contract to securing "availability," that no amount was "set 
apart . . . that could be interpreted as consideration 
separate from counsel's hourly rate," and that the contract 
"specifically articulate[d] that the retainer [was] of an 
advance fee nature and in payment of contemplated 
services." Id. at 55. In the circumstances, the court 
concluded that the fee, though intended to be non- 
refundable, was a special retainer that the attorney was 
obligated to return. 
 
We agree with the district court in this case that the 
language of the Agreement indicates that the parties 
intended the $1 million to be a non-refundable, general 
retainer and that the provision for non-refundability is valid 
under Pennsylvania law.12 First, while the contract does not 
use the term "available," on its face it requires Beausang to 
be available to handle an indeterminate amount of litigation 
for an unspecified amount of time. In fact, Raymark 
expected the work to last "at least 30 months," and 
Beausang clearly anticipated long-term work. Raymark's 
Brief at 6; Beausang's Brief at 15. Second, the contract 
specifically outlines in a separate clause from the one 
providing for the $1 million retainer how Raymark will pay 
Beausang for legal services rendered. Third, the Agreement 
describes the $1 million as a "non-refundable retainer," 
before setting forth in other clauses the terms for payment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. While the district court unquestionably described the agreement as 
having the characteristics of a "general retainer" it made limited use of 
that term. See Raymark, 1997 WL 746125, at *13. Raymark, however, 
acknowledges that the court found that the Agreement provided for a 
"general retainer," as it indicates in its brief that the court's findings 
in 
part "rest[ ] upon the erroneous premise that the Agreement comprised 
a so-called `general retainer.' " Brief at 23. 
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of litigation costs and for managing the legal team. These 
provisions demonstrate that Raymark understood the $1 
million to be a one-time payment, not an "advance" upon 
which Beausang could draw as expenses related to 
litigation or administration mounted. Raymark's acceptance 
of the Letter Agreement also shows that Raymark 
understood that the $1 million was "fully earned" and non- 
refundable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 
correctly held that there was no question of material fact 
regarding whether the contract was a permissible, 
enforceable agreement with a $1 million fee as a non- 
refundable, general retainer. See Dardovitch, 1999 WL 
689955, at *8. 
 
3. Reasonableness and Equity 
 
After concluding that on its face the Agreement was 
enforceable, the court, as McKenzie requires, assessed the 
reasonableness of the Agreement in light of subsequent 
events, namely, Raymark's termination of the Agreement. 
See McKenzie, 758 F.2d at 101. In making this analysis, 
the court held that instead of merely calculating the 
amount that Beausang had earned on an hourly basis, it 
could consider benefits beyond those paid for"legal 
services."13 Raymark, 1997 WL 746125, at *12. Finding that 
the legal and organizational services were to be covered by 
other payments, the court determined that the $1 million 
was a "carrot" or "financial incentive" used to attract 
Beausang and was reasonable. Id. at *13. The court 
reasoned that Raymark had spent $1 million to buy the 
"opportunity" to use Beausang's services at capped costs -- 
analogizing this to an options contract, where the option is 
worth something, though less than the fully-realized 
opportunity. Id. Thus, the court concluded that Beausang 
had earned the $1 million, despite working for only ten 
weeks, because Raymark paid the $1 million for access to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The district court noted that while Pennsylvania law allows courts in 
the context of confessions of judgment to reduce unreasonable awards, 
see Raymark, 1997 WL 746125, at *9, no standard exists to measure the 
reasonableness of an amount. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Bolus, 655 A.2d 
997, 1000 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (charge of more than $70,000 for 
attorney fees for filing single document "blatantly unreasonable"). 
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Beausang's services on terms favorable to Raymark. Id. at 
*12-13. 
 
In light of the McKenzie standard, the district court 
correctly reasoned that Beausang "cannot be exposed to the 
reproach of oppression and overreaching" regarding 
retaining the fee. Id. at *14. The court discussed at length 
a case similar to McKenzie decided by the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in which a prominent attorney 
recovered a $1 million contingency fee pursuant to a 
written agreement after filing a petition for certiorari. Id. at 
*14 n.31. See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 
602 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1979). While the client in Brobeck 
thought that the fee was unreasonable and excessive, the 
court of appeals in rejecting this argument took into 
account the sophistication of the parties, the fact that the 
client wished to attract a certain caliber of attorney, and 
the fact that the client, after negotiations with the attorney, 
had proposed the fee arrangement which it later 
challenged. Id. at 875. 
 
The district court in this case made a similar analysis 
predicated on the facts presented here. Furthermore, 
Raymark's complaint regarding the $1 million fee is weaker 
than the client's position in Brobeck as Raymark offered the 
fee to Beausang on a "take it or leave it" basis. In Brobeck 
and here, the attorneys clearly were paid very well, but the 
context of the payments and the fact that the clients 
received some intangible benefits in retaining the attorneys 
meant that the courts could conclude that the 
compensation in each case was not so high as to be 
inequitable and unfair. 
 
Raymark argues that, even if the district court properly 
decided that the $1 million was a general retainer fee, still 
Beausang did not prove that he would not be limited to 
recovery in quantum meruit. The Pennsylvania courts have 
recognized that an attorney with a contract to perform a 
specific service for a specific fee who is discharged may 
recover a proper amount for his services on a quantum 
meruit basis. See Hiscott and Robinson v. King, 626 A.2d 
1235, 1236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Sundheim v. Beaver 
County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 14 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1940). But this general rule for specific fee contracts 
 
                                13 
  
does not fit the facts in this case. Rather, we are concerned 
with a situation in which an attorney with a general 
retainer has been discharged. In that situation, he may 
recover "at least in some circumstances, beyond payment 
for the value of services already rendered." Kelly, 2 F. 
Supp.2d at 449. The facts here present one of those 
circumstances. In addition, the basic principle that 
attorneys should not receive "unearned" income is not in 
jeopardy here because the district court correctly concluded 
that Raymark did receive benefits -- though not in the form 
of legal services rendered on an hourly basis -- for its 
payment of $1 million. 
 
4. Chilling effect on right to terminate counsel 
 
Raymark further contends that its right to discharge its 
attorneys was "chilled" by its inability to recoup some 
portion of the $1 million. Raymark argues that special 
retainers hold a client hostage to the attorney. Raymark 
analogizes this case to Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers 
Union, 679 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 1996), in which the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held unenforceable a provision 
negotiated by sophisticated parties in which the client was 
required to give the attorney six months' notice before it 
could terminate the contract. The court held that this 
provision chilled the client's right to terminate its 
relationship with the attorney. Id. at 1197-1201. The court 
concluded, however, that the attorney was entitled to 
reasonable notice of termination, which it determined was 
one month rather than the three days the client gave. 
 
To the extent that Cohen is inconsistent with our result, 
we decline to follow it.14 It appears clear that the retainer in 
Cohen was general rather than special, see Cohen v. Radio- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We could distinguish Cohen on the theory that Cohen's $100,000 
annual compensation was for 1,000 hours of service and thus was 
different from the $1 million retainer here which was not tied directly to 
services to be performed measured on a temporal basis. Moreover, in 
this case Raymark was to pay Beausang ongoing fees on a quarterly 
basis plus fees for trial time directly linked to days of service. The 
tenor 
of Cohen is such, however, that we doubt that the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey if confronted with the facts of this case would distinguish it from 
Cohen. 
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Electronics Officers Union, 645 A.2d 1248, 1261 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (Villanueva, J., dissenting), but 
the court did not seem to consider this point in reaching its 
decision. At the very least, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey did not say that it was reaching its result because 
the retainer was special rather than general. Nevertheless 
our review of cases in other jurisdictions convinces us that 
the distinction between general and special retainers is 
crucial with respect to non-refundability of an attorney's 
fees. We believe that Cohen best can be understood in the 
context of the New Jersey Supreme Court's historically 
strong powers to regulate attorneys under the New Jersey 
Constitution. See Cohen, 679 A.2d at 1195-96. As a federal 
court making a determination of state law in a diversity 
case, we think that we should predicate our ruling on more 
conventional principles. See Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 
37 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
It is true that in Pennsylvania "[t]he right of a client to 
terminate the attorney-client relationship is an implied term 
of every contract of employment of counsel. . . ." See Hiscott 
and Robinson, 626 A.2d at 1237. Nevertheless, this 
principle is not in jeopardy here because Beausang does 
not contend that Raymark could not discharge him. In any 
event, we are satisfied that regardless of the chilling effect 
of a non-refundability provision in a general retainer, the 
client's right to terminate an attorney must accommodate 
an attorney's right to retain the non-refundable retainer. 
 
Finally, we recognize that Raymark argues that there 
exists "a substantial factual issue as to whether and to 
what extent Raymark's right to discharge counsel was 
chilled." But this argument does not require that we reverse 
the district court. First, of course, as is obvious and as the 
district court found, Raymark did not hesitate to terminate 
Beausang. Second, the argument proves too much because 
it always could be contended that after paying a non- 
refundable general retainer a client would be reluctant to 
discharge an attorney and thereby surrender the benefit it 
obtained by payment of the retainer. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we carefully have reviewed all arguments 
which Raymark has put forward, mindful of the obligations 
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of attorneys to their clients. After making that review, we 
find no reason to disturb the conclusions of the district 
court. Consequently, the order of December 2, 1997, will be 
affirmed. 
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